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The ADEA at the Top of the
Food Chain: Who's Protecting
the Higher-Salaried Employees?
Discriminatory practices in employ-
ment continue, especially in terms of
disparate treatment of employees based
on unequal salaries and other factors.
Until one significant case discussed
here, Hazen Paper, prosecution of dis-
parate treatment was effective, but its
future is in jeopardy. Alternative means
of combating unjust age discrimination
in employment need to be found. And
older, higher-salaried employees need to
be aware of their remaining rights sub-
ject to disparate treatment tests.
By Grant T. Moher
Grant T Moher is a third-year law student at
Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. His legal interests focus on the rights of
employees in the fields of labor law and worker's com-
pensation.
21a
n 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act,' codifying the rights of
women, nonwhites, and other minorities to
legal action for discriminatory employment
practices.' Shortly thereafter, Congress enact-
ed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) to protect those age 40 and over from dis-
crimination on the job. The ADEA was modeled
after Title VII; thus most of the ADEA's provisions
are "substantively identical" to those of its prede-
cessor.4 For example, both acts use virtually the
same language to outlaw discrimination not only
by employers but also by labor unions and employ-
ment agencies.s
There are differences between the two, most
notably with regard to motive for the discriminato-
ry action. For example, both Title VII and the
ADEA allow a cause of action for disparate treat-
ment-when an employer's actions facially dis-
criminate against a protected group.' However, it is
not clear that the ADEA allows a cause of action
where an employer's action is facially neutral but
its results tend to fall more harshly on a protected
group.7 This cause of action is known as disparate
impact, and it is recognized both in case law' and
the statutory language of Title VII.9
Although never explicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court, disparate impact causes of action
in ADEA cases have been effectively rendered obso-
lete by the Supreme Court's ruling in Hazen Paper
v. Biggins.o Also, disparate treatment claims,
although not rendered obsolete, now require direct
age-related animus to establish proof of discrimi-
natory intent."
The Facts of Hazen Paper
In Hazen Paper, the plaintiff was fired from his job
with the defendant when he was 62 years old,
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ostensibly because he had been doing business with
a competitor.1 2 The jury at the trial court level did
not believe the defendant's reason and rendered a
verdict for the plaintiff, because he had been
employed with the defendant for almost 10 years
and at the time of termination his pension was
"within a hairbreadth of vesting."" However, his
pension would have vested because of his years of
service at the company, not his age." On review, the
Supreme Court held that years of service were not
a proxy (statutory approximate) for age and thus
the plaintiff could not bring a claim under the
ADEA." The Court reasoned that the legislative
intent of the ADEA was to keep older employees
from being discriminated against because of their
age, and not because of other factors correlated
with age."
As a result of this decision, older employees
whose seniority and experience have brought them
higher salaries may be vulnerable to termination
because of their salaries with no recourse.
Advocates for the elderly are now re-evaluating the
causes of action available under current law to com-
bat age discrimination in the workplace. This article
considers the rights of higher-salaried employees
subject to disparate treatment and disparate impact
tests, given the impact of Hazen Paper.
Disparate Treatment Analysis and the
Higher-Salaried Employee
In order to make a prima facie case of disparate
treatment under the ADEA, the employee must
show that (1) he or she is within the protected age
group, (2) that he or she was qualified, (3) that
despite these qualifications, he or she was dis-
charged (or subject to some other adverse employ-
ment decision), and (4) that the position was filled
by someone of similar qualifications." The employ-
er can rebut the charge by exhibiting a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge." One
of the main ways of doing this is to show that the
discharge was based on a reasonable factor other
than age."'
Some disparate treatment cases in the courts of
appeal can be used to show the development of this
doctrine as it applies to the ADEA, as well as its
limitations as a cause of action. As demonstrated
by the following examples, the problems associated
with disparate treatment analysis tend to be
twofold: (1) whether the cost of older, higher-
salaried employees can be used for the employer's
defense as a reasonable factor other than age, and
(2) whether a showing of discrimination based on
factors such as tenure status, seniority, or experi-
ence can be used as a proxy (statutory approxi-
mate) for age.
Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc. is a representative
example of disparate treatment as a legal theory.20
In Dace, the plaintiff was demoted from his
salaried position as a punch press operator to an
hourly position.21 Disparate treatment is applied
because plaintiff is demoted at age 53 and replaced
by a 40-year-old who was being paid less money.22
The plaintiff contends, and provides compelling
evidence to support his theory, that this is an eco-
nomically based move 3 done to avoid having to
pay the plaintiff his high salary and a large sever-
ance package when the company closed.24
Although cost was the primary factor in the
decision, and Dace's higher salary had accrued
from his years of service, the court makes the con-
nection to age.25 It reasons that Dace's claim under
the ADEA is actionable because years of experience
and age are so closely related that they become a
sort of statutory approximate (proxy) for one
another.6 This follows an earlier decision that dealt
with the proxies of tenure status and age.27 Both of
these courts recognized the close relationship
between age and related factors and allowed a dis-
parate treatment claim. When "the plain intent and
effect of the defendant's practice was to eliminate
older workers who had built up, through years of
satisfactory service, higher salaries than their
younger counterparts[,]"" courts have typically
held there to be a cause of action.29
Another case to demonstrate the logic of the
appellate courts in this area is Metz v. Transit Mix,
Inc." The court in Metz makes it clear that the case
is one of disparate treatment, rather than impact,
and explains that as such the plaintiff must estab-
lish discriminatory intentions on the part of the
defendant." The plaintiff, age 54, was replaced by
a younger, lower-salaried employee, without being
offered a pay cut to keep his job. The court held
that the employer's firing of Metz contravened the
ADEA because it found that Metz's years of expe-
rience were a proxy for age and that firing him
because of the salary built up by his years of service
did not constitute a "reasonable factor other than
age.""
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These cases are examples among numerous oth-
ers before Hazen Paper in which a connection was
made between age and other related factors (expe-
rience, etc.) to prove intent and to rule that cost
was not a reasonable factor other than age.34
Disparate Impact Analysis and the Higher-
Salaried Employee
Until Hazen Paper, disparate impact analysis had
been a relatively accepted method of pursuing an
ADEA claim in which discriminatory intent could
not be proven." The reasoning for allowing this
sort of claim can best be seen in the fact pattern of
Griggs v. Duke Power, the first case dealing with
disparate impact in a Title VII setting. 6
In Griggs, the employer had an openly discrim-
inatory policy of not promoting blacks until the
passage of Title VII. 7 Then, the employer changed
its policy to require that for promotion, one need-
ed both a high school diploma and passing scores
on two general intelligence tests not related to job
performance ability." The employees claimed that
even though the employer's policy was facially neu-
tral, it operated to restrict a disproportionate num-
ber of minorities and thus contravened Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act." The Supreme Court agreed.
The holding specified that the absence of discrimi-
natory intent does not absolve an employer from
employment practices that operate to exclude
minorities for no justifiable business purpose.4 0
This doctrine was first applied to an ADEA case
in 1980 in Geller v. Markham, a case involving a
teacher (Geller) who was a member of the ADEA
protected age group.4 ' She was not hired to a teach-
ing position because of the school board's con-
scious effort to hire less experienced, and conse-
quently less costly, teachers.4 2 The level of experi-
ence was determined in steps, with the "sixth step"
being five years of experience or more. 43 The
employer's stated policy was to hire only teachers
below this sixth step of teaching experience.44
Geller, along with 92.6 percent of other teachers in
the protected age group, was in the sixth-step level
of employment experience; however, 60 percent of
teachers below the age of the protected age group
also had this sixth-step level of experience.s
Nonetheless, the Geller court found that the statis-
tical disparity rendered the policy discriminatory as
a matter of law. 46
The application of disparate impact to ADEA
cases has been a source of great contention. One
critic points out the fact that Geller failed to even
mention Griggs-the source of disparate impact
doctrine-because the rationale behind Griggs did
not apply in the ADEA format." This argument
centers around the idea that one of the main goals
of disparate impact analysis as put forth in Griggs
is the breaking down of past discrimination." One
is unlikely to argue successfully that a higher-paid
older worker has been the subject of lifelong dis-
crimination. However, another equally important
goal of the disparate impact doctrine is to keep
those in a particular protected group from being
discriminated against because they are members of
that group.4 9 In this sense, applying the disparate
impact doctrine to ADEA claims would be valid to
keep employers from discriminating against older
workers for stereotypes about their value and pro-
ductivity. Regardless of the fact that older workers
have not been subject to lifelong discrimination,
the discrimination they face in the workplace as
they age is just as problematic.
Another theory advanced by the same critic is
that, "unlike race, there is an inherent correlation
between age and ability.""o Because of these
inequalities, it is argued that disparate impact can-
not be a viable theory." While it may be true that
as a general matter older workers are not trained in
specific current fields such as computer sciences
and other highly technical areas, a general lack of
training does not translate to a lack of ability. As a
group, older people are not inferior workers."
Many elderly workers are effectively trained in the
same fields as their younger counterparts through
continuing education, on-the-job training, and
other educational sources. Older workers often
bring valuable life experiences to their jobs that
younger workers may not yet possess. In fact, to
claim that as a group older workers are inferior
contravenes the very spirit of the ADEA itself.54
Hazen Paper's Effect on Disparate
Treatment Analysis
The dissent by Judge Easterbrook in Metz" pro-
vides a compelling argument against a broad read-
ing of employer liability under the ADEA and
paves the way for the decision in Hazen Paper. It
stresses that "you do not get immunity from an
otherwise lawful employment decision by growing
old."s, Entrepreneurial decisions such as cutting
costs by firing higher-paid workers are argued to be
eminently reasonable, as employers often fire
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employees who are making salaries out of propor-
tion to their productivity, regardless of whether
they are in the ADEA protected age group." Also,
it is argued the ADEA was designed only to protect
those fired because of their age and not for any
other reason." These are two of the main themes in
the later decision by the Supreme Court in Hazen
Paper."
The opinion in Hazen Paper, while drawing
much commentary concerning its effects on dis-
parate impact analysis,6 0 will have a serious effect
on disparate treatment as well. Hazen Paper
endorses the extreme position of treating the cost
factor of salary as an "inherently reasonable, non-
age criterion that remains immune from challenge
unless it can be exposed as a pretext to target older
workers."' The Court makes it clear that the
ADEA is not designed to protect people from dis-
crimination on the basis of other factors, no matter
how age-related those factors may be.6
However, the Court with Hazen Paper does not
close the door entirely. The Court specified that
factors such as experience, tenure status, and the
like may function as proxies for age only in certain
instances, specifically when the correlation is statis-
tically sufficient. Hazen Paper explicitly rejects
using pension status as a proxy for age,64 but it
leaves the door open to using other factors as prox-
ies for age in limited circumstances:
We do not preclude the possibility that an employer
who targets employees with a particular pension sta-
tus on the assumption that these employees are likely
to be older thereby engages in age discrimination.
Pension status may be a proxy for age, not in the sense
that the ADEA makes the two factors equivalent[,] but
in the sense that the employer may suppose a correla-
tion between the two factors and act accordingly."
By so saying, the Court has left the possibility of
using other factors as proxies for age, but it pre-
vents courts from making the assumption of age
discrimination without statistical evidence or proof
of discriminatory motive. The fact remains, howev-
er, that Hazen Paper's condemnation of pension
status and seniority" as statutory proxies for age
means an uphill battle for employees to prove the
sort of intent necessary to win on a disparate treat-
ment claim under the ADEA.
The Disparate Impact Doctrine After
Hazen Paper
The most important feature of the disparate impact
doctrine is that it does not require a showing of dis-
criminatory intent on the part of the employer."7
Thus, the emphasis that the Court in Hazen Paper
places on the necessity for a discriminatory motive
casts some doubt as to whether a disparate impact
cause of action is still viable. "If defendants can
claim they simply overlooked the question of
whether their actions violated the law, there would
be little use for aggrieved individuals to bring suit
under the ADEA unless they could prove a clear
intent to discriminate.""
While this point may be somewhat cynical,"9 it
has a ring of truth to it. If an employer can make a
reasonable argument that his or her actions were
taken in ignorance of the fact that they were affect-
ing a disproportionate number of elderly workers,
a court's hands would be tied in applying disparate
impact. With nothing to stand as a statutory equiv-
alent for age, only age itself could suffice to demon-
strate discriminatory intent and not factors that
had previously been used as statutory proxies. 0
Employers are nearly always going to have some
sort of explanation for their employment decisions,
if not at the time of making them, certainly by the
time they are hauled into court. Thus, many
employers will offer some legitimate business rea-
son (i.e., "reasonable factors other than age" such
as cost and low productivity) to protect their deci-
sions from being unreasonable and thus discrimi-
nating under the ADEA.
The expansion of reasonable factors other than
age may result in employees having a more difficult
time bringing an ADEA claim with a disparate
impact theory." However, this does not have to be
the case. As one supporter of disparate impact after
Hazen Paper states:
[I]t would be more consistent with the stated policies
of the ADEA to allow disparate impact as an offensive
weapon and give the reasonable factors other than age
as an absolute defensive shield. If one purpose of the
ADEA is to promote employment based on ability and
not age and to prevent arbitrary discrimination, these
policies would be frustrated if the reasonable factors
other than age provision absolutely barred any dis-
parate impact claim from the courts.72
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If this policy were followed, courts could deter-
mine what factors other than age are reasonable
factors that would act as affirmative defenses and
what factors other than age are unreasonable.
This scenario, though logical, is not happening.
A number of circuits have expressly rejected the
availability of the disparate impact doctrine in
ADEA actions.74 As a result, case law defining the
"reasonable factors other than age" that might
rebut a discrimination charge has been chilled.
Also, the minority of circuits that still recognize
disparate impact as a valid cause of action under
the ADEA have done so without addressing Hazen
Paper's logic. 75 Rather than attempt to modify the
disparate impact test so that it comports with the
decision in Hazen Paper,6 these circuits have been
content to follow their own existing precedent.
They continue to allow disparate impact causes of
action, relying on the fact that Hazen Paper pro-
claimed to speak only to disparate treatment in the
ADEA.7
Alternatives to ADEA Suits on Facts
Showing Disparate Impact
While the doctrine of disparate treatment is still
alive (albeit with a more difficult burden of proof
for the plaintiff),"7 disparate impact is in serious
trouble. After Hazen Paper, older employees are
left to ponder what avenues are available to them
to pursue cases of unjust discrimination absent evi-
dence of age-related animus.
One possible source could be Congress itself,
which could step in to restore the full scope of
ADEA claims.7 ' However, as one scholar notes:
"the ambiguity of Hazen Paper may very well be a
conscious effort by the Court to avoid the congres-
sional reversal that has met many of its recent pro-
employer decisions by forcing lower courts to reach
the more 'palatable decision to reject disparate
impact analysis on their own."'" By giving the cir-
cuits an ambiguous opinion, those courts can inter-
pret the logic as they see fit. Thus far, a majority of
circuit courts that have addressed the issue have
come to the conclusion that disparate impact is not
a viable cause of action in the ADEA context."
With this ambiguous opinion, any effort on the
part of Congress to contravene the decision and
legislate a coherent standard in its place becomes
much more difficult.
Another possibility for contesting age-discrimi-
natory employment procedures is the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)." Section
510 of ERISA is endorsed by Hazen Paper as a pos-
sible remedy for firing to keep an employee's pen-
sion from vesting.83 One scholar in particular also
feels that ERISA could be used in a growing num-
ber of cases previously thought to be solely within
the realm of the ADEA.8 4
After Hazen Paper, bringing an ADEA dis-
parate impact claim in a circuit court that does not
recognize the cause of action may be impossible.
When addressing the matter of an ADEA suit
brought solely with statistics of disparate impact,
the Seventh Circuit explicitly said that statistics
alone would not be sufficient." The court needed
evidence that would support an illegal discrimina-
tory employer decision." Considering that most of
the circuit courts that have addressed the issue
since Hazen Paper have held that disparate impact
is no longer a viable cause of action,8 7 many liti-
gants will be left with little hope of success.
In the circuit courts that still accept disparate
impact as a cause of action," no change is likely
unless the Supreme Court speaks directly to the
issue. The present concern is with the circuit courts
that have not explicitly held that disparate impact
is unavailable under the ADEA." Arguments such
as those mentioned below can be considered.
In order to make a cognizable claim for dis-
parate impact under the ADEA, it is necessary to
understand the relationship between age and rea-
sonable factors other than age that cannot be used
to prove intent. As it stands, there are three possi-
ble approaches to determining when cost and crite-
ria other than age are reasonable factors." The first
follows Hazen Paper in that it assumes age-based
impact is not determinative of liability and, absent
legitimate evidence of a discriminatory pretext to
target older workers, an employee would not have
a cause of action under the ADEA.91 The second is
the majority view prior to Hazen Paper.12 It con-
demns neutral cost or other comparisons as age-
based discrimination by focusing on the correlation
between seniority, salary, and age.93 The third
approach is the so-called balancing approach."
This balancing approach, put forth by one
advocate of disparate impact analysis, could be
something the circuit courts that have not already
rejected disparate impact could use in spite of the
decision in Hazen Paper.95 This approach would
resist both extremes and "focus on the cost com-
parison as facially neutral, and thus a potential rea-
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sonable factor other than age, but undesirable
because of its predictable age-based effect." Thus,
an employer would not be subject to liability for
using the cost criterion, but would have to justify it
beyond simply an entrepreneurial decision.
Another argument that disparate impact should
apply to the ADEA as well came before Hazen
Paper with the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act." This act codified the test for disparate impact
analysis in a Title VII setting, yet it did not make a
corresponding change in the framework of the
ADEA." Because of this, opinions are split as to
whether the similar nature of the acts means dis-
parate impact analysis is to apply to both acts, or
whether the legislative silence is an indirect rejec-
tion of disparate impact analysis under the
ADEA."9 While the legislative silence is puzzling,
the argument can be made that since the ADEA
and Title VII have historically been interpreted in a
similar fashion, Congress naturally intended a
change to one to be applicable to the other.'0
Conclusion
Society has an interest in seeing job security for
older Americans, especially ones who have built up
higher salaries as a result of faithful years of ser-
vice. No perfect solution to ensure this job security
presents itself, but the fact remains that a solution
must be reached. Congressional intent with the
ADEA will not be served as long as employers are
"able to cloak their actions in economics or feigned
ignorance."' As it stands, employees have the dif-
ficult (and often impossible) burden of proving bad
faith on the employer's part without having the sig-
nificant weapon of disparate impact and the ability
to use other factors as proxies for age. Indeed,
without a pink slip stating "fired-too old," an
employee's burden of proving discrimination
becomes a burden many worthy litigants will be
unable to bear.
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